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ranking on the development scale), are African nations. It is equally well-known that many African nations are
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living for a country’s inhabitants? The natural resource curse hypothesis attempts to explain why the revenues
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ELECTRICITY: A CURSED RESOURCE?
Devin Long
I. INTRODUCTION
 As is well documented in the media, the 
standard of living in many African countries is ex-
tremely low.  In fact, in the most recent edition of 
the Human Development Report, released by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
thirty-seven of the forty-one countries classified 
as “low development” (the lowest ranking on 
the development scale), are African nations.  It 
is equally well-known that many African nations 
are ‘blessed’ with valuable natural resource en-
dowments that should bring enormous revenues 
to these countries.  The disparity between theory 
and reality leads one to wonder, why do these 
revenues not raise the standard of living for a 
country’s inhabitants?  The natural resource curse 
hypothesis attempts to explain why the revenues 
are not allocated efficiently.
 Kojucharov (2007) clearly explains the the-
ory behind the natural resource curse hypothesis. 
“Time after time, countries exporting resources 
such as oil and diamonds have seen enormous 
amounts of revenue pass through their hands, yet 
have emerged with fragile economies in which 
resource wealth has exacerbated the very prob-
lems it was envisioned to solve.”  The curse is es-
sentially broken down in to two categories.  Ko-
jucharov calls them the Economic Mechanisms 
(elsewhere referred to as the Dutch disease) and 
the Behavioral Mechanisms (also known as the Ni-
gerian disease).
 With the Dutch disease, the natural re-
source export causes a high volume of revenue 
to flow into the country, raising demand, which 
drives up prices, causing increased cost of living 
(assuming that revenues are not evenly distribut-
ed).  Domestic goods become more expensive 
than similar goods produced abroad, causing 
an appreciation of the real exchange rate and 
reducing the competitiveness of the domestic 
goods on the world market.  The Dutch disease 
also makes resource exporting countries vulner-
able to changes in market prices which can lead 
to budget deficits if the country does not save 
“boom” profits to cover “bust” spending (Ko-
jucharov 2007). It is also characterized by an inef-
ficient allocation of resources towards the primary 
sector, preventing growth of the manufacturing 
and services sectors (Zenthofer 2011).
 In a present-day example of the Dutch 
disease, Zenthofer (2011) compares Mauritius to 
Trinidad and Tobago- two countries with very simi-
lar histories, ethnic compositions, and resource 
endowments.  He found that Mauritius’ decision 
to diversify has led to a “relatively rich and sta-
ble economy,” while Trinidad and Tobago, which 
relies on natural gas revenues, suffers from lower 
research and development, a less stable govern-
ment, and low prospect for future growth.
 On the other hand, the Nigerian disease 
deals with fiscal mismanagement of govern-
ments.  Kojucharov cites a “mountain-top resort 
in Venezuela and an extravagant new airport in 
Saudi Arabia” as examples of governments invest-
ing resource revenues in high-budget, low-return 
infrastructure projects that give the impression of 
growth and development without actually help-
ing the people.  This type of project can quickly 
deplete government funds and lead to deficits. 
Additionally, the “rentier state theory” explains 
that, once a government has substantial resource 
revenues, it has no need to tax its people.  In this 
way, the people who would be taxpayers have 
less leverage to hold the government account-
able, leading to decreased transparency.   This 
sets the stage for corruption and rent-seeking, 
which takes money away from vital sectors like 
education and health.  The combination of the 
Dutch and Nigerian diseases often makes the 
people worse off than before the discovery of the 
abundant natural resources (Kojucharov 2007). 
As shown in Section IV of this paper, corruption is 
a serious problem in African countries.  This lends 
evidence to the hypothesis that, if there is a re-
source curse in these African nations, it is prob-
ably from the Nigerian disease.
 In African nations, the electrical grids are 
often unreliable and not large enough to serve 
a majority of the population.  Especially in under-
developed nations, this scarcity makes electric-
ity a very valuable resource.  A few of the more 
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developed countries have learned to produce 
electricity efficiently enough to export it to the 
surrounding countries.  As the export of electricity 
should bring substantial revenues into a country 
and as it is derived from natural resources, I won-
dered if it too could cause a resource curse.    This 
study aims to determine whether, by means of a 
resource curse, electricity export revenues nega-
tively impact corruption and quality of life in Af-
rica.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
 A number of recent studies have found 
that the Nigerian disease is present in many of to-
day’s economies.   In an empirical study, Williams 
(2010) shows that resource rich countries are less 
transparent, that reduced transparency stems 
from resource revenues, and that the revenues 
have a negative effect on economic growth. 
Avom (2010) finds that Central and Sub-Saharan 
African countries who rely heavily on natural re-
sources suffer from larger inequalities, smaller hu-
man capital development, and smaller revenue 
growth.
 If the results of my study indicate that a re-
source curse is negatively impacting the people 
of Africa, there are a few policies that could com-
bat the curse or prevent it in the future. Several 
studies have examined how to avoid the natural 
resource curse.  Voigt (2011) points to the “Alas-
kan solution” in which Alaskan residents receive 
a portion of oil revenues each year.  This holds 
public officials accountable and has been pro-
posed to ensure that Libya’s new government 
can avoid the corruption that has plagued its 
predecessors.  Kojucharov (2007) describes a 
World Bank plan that was supposed to prevent a 
resource curse in Chad.  In the Revenue Manage-
ment Plan (RMP), Chad’s oil revenues were kept 
in an offshore account, introducing them gradu-
ally to avoid appreciation of the real exchange 
rate; surplus revenues were kept in a stabilization 
fund, to keep suppliers immune to market price 
changes; a large portion of revenues were given 
to the health, education, rural development, and 
water/resource management sectors to ensure 
that the funds were not misused for public gain; 
and two programs were initiated to provide the 
citizens of Chad technical and financial training. 
Although the RMP failed, due to the Chadian 
government’s unwillingness to allow an outside 
entity to control its revenues, it provided valuable 
ideas for avoiding the curse.  Avom (2010) sug-
gests government investment in manufacturing to 
promote diversification of central and Sub-Saha-
ran economies.   Pegg (2010) explains that, while 
Botswana’s economy is based on diamond rev-
enues and is unlikely to diversify, its emphasis on 
saving and investing in infrastructure have led to 
a stable economy with a relatively high standard 
of living.  Hammond (2011) suggests that Venezu-
ela’s decision to use oil revenues to invest in hu-
man and physical capital and social welfare is 
the “cure for the disease.”
 Oil and mineral revenues are the com-
monly cited sources of the resource curse.  There 
exists a gap in the literature of alternate sources 
that have not been examined.  Thus, this study 
adds to existing literature by examining electric-
ity exports, a previously unexplored cause of the 
curse, one that is derived from natural resources 
rather than a resource itself.   The study also hopes 
that a solution to poverty may be easier to find 
from increased knowledge of its causes.
III. DATA
 The data set contains information from 
25 African countries from 2005-2008, providing 
100 observations.  The countries were chosen by 
availability of necessary data, which could have 
resulted in an unrepresentative sample if, for ex-
ample, there was incomplete data for the poor-
est, smallest, or most corrupt countries.   However, 
the existing data set contains a geographically 
diverse set of countries as seen in Table 1 on the 
next page.  The set also contains six net exporters 
of electricity, seven net importers, seven countries 
that neither export nor import, and five that are 
net exporters in some years but net importers in 
others.
 The data used comes from four separate 
sources: the Human Development Index from the 
UNDP (2011), the CIA World Factbook (2011), the 
World Development Indicators from the World 
Bank (2011), and the Worldwide Governance In-
dex (2011) from the World Bank.  The Human De-
velopment Index (HDI) takes a value between 0 
and 1, and uses four indicators (life expectancy at 
birth, mean years of schooling for adults, expect-
ed years of schooling for children, and Gross Na-
tional Income (GNI) per capita, to measure three 
dimensions of human welfare: health, education, 
and standard of living.  The HDI statistics are all 
Long
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contained in the UNDP’s 
Human Development Re-
port which “requires the 
highest standards of data 
quality, consistency and 
transparency” (http://hdr.
undp.org).  In addition to 
the HDI, values for GNI per 
capita and mean years 
of schooling were found 
through the UNDP’s Hu-
man Development Report 
(2011).
 The CIA World 
Factbook (2011) contains 
detailed country profiles. 
These profiles contain infor-
mation about the govern-
ment, people, geography, 
and economy of indi-
vidual countries.  The key 
variables from this source 
were electricity exports 
and imports, measured in 
kilowatt hours per year.
 The World Bank’s 
World Development In-
dicators (2011) contains 
data from 209 countries for 
the past fifty years.  While 
there are over one thou-
sand indicators, those used 
in this project include: life 
expectancy at birth, elec-
tricity production, oil ex-
ports, and mineral exports.
 Finally, the World-
wide Governance Index 
(2011) contains a Control of Corruption Indicator 
that will be used to determine whether electric-
ity exports cause increased corruption.  The in-
dex “captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, includ-
ing both petty and grand forms of corruption as 
well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and pri-
vate interests” (http://info.worldbank.org).  Each 
country is given a governance rating between 
-2.5 and 2.5, with the highest scores indicating the 
least corrupt governments.  The rating for each 
country comes from a specific set of sources.  For 
example, Angola was rated by twelve sources, in-
cluding The African Development Bank Country 
Policy and Institutional Assessments, Global Integ-
rity Index, Economist Intelligence Unit, and nine 
other expert sources.
 The following table, Table 1, contains de-
scriptions of the twenty-five countries included in 
this study.  Attributes included are: geographic 
region, whether the country is a net exporter or 
importer of electricity, the country’s highest and 
lowest values for CCI, and the highest and lowest 
values for HDI.  Table 1 shows that there is likely 
a connection between standard of living and 
Long
Table 1: Description of countries included in data set
Countries by 
region
Electricity Net 
Export/ Import
Control of
Corruption Index
Human
Development Index
Northern Africa
Algeria Importer 2 years, 
Exporter 2 years
-0.44 to -0.4 0.65 to 0.67
Egypt Exporter -0.68 to -0.55 0.59 to 0.61
Libya Neither -0.91 to -0.8 0.73 to 0.74
Morocco Importer -0.31 to -0.21 0.54 to 0.56
Sudan Neither -1.47 to -1.13 0.36 to 0.37
Tunisia Importer 1 year, 
Exporter 3 years
-0.04 to 0.03 0.65 to 0.67
Western Africa
Benin Importer -0.94 to -0.35 0.42 to 0.43
Côte d’Ivoire Exporter -1.3 to -1.14 0.38 to 0.40
Nigeria Exporter -1.28 to-0.84 0.40 to 0.42
Senegal Neither -0.47 to 0 0.39 to 0.41
Togo Importer -1.13 to -0.75 0.39 to 0.42
Central Africa
Angola Neither -1.36 to -1.24 0.38 to 0.40
Cameroon Neither -1.2 to -0.91 0.44 to 0.45
Democratic 
Republic of 
the Congo
Exporter -1.54 to -1.27 0.22 to 0.24
Gabon Neither -0.98 to -0.51 0.63 to 0.64
Republic of 
the Congo
Importer 3 years, 
Exporter 1 year
-1.11 to -1.07 0.47 to 0.48
Eastern Africa
Ethiopia Neither -0.77 to -0.62 0.29 to 0.32
Kenya Importer 3 years, 
Exporter 1 year
-1.02 to -0.88 0.44 to 0.46
Mozambique Exporter -0.61 to -0.47 0.26 to 0.28
Tanzania Importer -0.78 to -0.28 0.37 to 0.39
Zambia Exporter -0.81 to -0.45 0.36 to 0.38
Zimbabwe Importer -1.37 to -1.34 0.12 to 0.16
Southern Africa
Botswana Importer 0.88 to 1.07 0.60 to 0.62
Namibia Importer 0.17 to 0.54 0.58 to 0.60
South Africa Importer 1 year, 
Exporter 3 years
0.22 to 0.58 .058 to .059
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geographic location.  For example, all 
of the Western African countries have 
nearly identical values for HDI.  Addi-
tionally, the data for Southern Africa 
suggests a correlation between cor-
ruption and standard of living.  South-
ern Africa is the only region with consis-
tently positive CCI values and the only 
region in which each country has an 
HDI greater than 0.50.
IV. EMPIRICAL DESIGN
 Of the twenty-five countries in 
this sample, ten are considered to be 
“very corrupt,” with CCIs lower than 
negative one, for at least two years. 
Only three of the twenty-five countries 
have CCIs greater than one.  Clearly, 
corruption is widespread in African 
countries.  Two separate Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regressions will be used 
to test this study’s hypotheses about 
the Nigerian disease.  The first regression tests the 
hypothesis that electricity exports increase cor-
ruption in Africa, and the second regression tests 
the hypothesis that this corruption leads to de-
creased quality of life.
H1: Electricity exports cause increased corruption in Africa.
H2: Increased corruption reduces standard of living in Africa.
 Model 1 will determine whether electric-
ity exports cause corruption, while controlling for 
human development.  The dependent variable is 
CCI.  The effects of electricity exports are mea-
sured by ELEC, which is the ratio of net electric-
ity exports to total electricity produced.   ELEC, 
OIL, and MINE are dummy variables that take the 
value of one if a country exports oil or minerals. 
ELEC, OIL, and MINE test for the resource curse. 
Controls for the level of human development, life 
expectancy (LIFEEXPEC), GNI per capita (GNIPC), 
and mean years of schooling (YSCHOOL) are also 
included in the regression.  The equation for Mod-
el 1 follows, and its key variables are explained in 
Table 2.
CCI = ɑ + ß1LE+ ß2YSCHOOL+ 
ß3GNIPC+ß4ELEC+ ß5OIL+ ß6MINE 
 Model 2 will test whether corruption neg-
atively impacts quality of life for the people of 
Africa.  The dependent variable is HDI, and the 
independent variable is CCI.  If Model 1 shows 
that electricity exports cause increased corrup-
tion, and Model 2 demonstrates that corruption 
negatively impacts the standard of living, then by 
the transitive property one can say that electricity 
exports cause a reduced standard of living.  If this 
is the case, a resource curse may be to blame. 
The equation for Model 2 is given below and is 
summarized in Table 3.
HDI = ɑ + ß1CCI
V. RESULTS
 The results for Model 1, which predicts cor-
ruption as a function of resource exports and a 
control set of variables, are presented in Table 
4.  It is important to remember, when reading the 
results, that CCI values for very corrupt nations 
are negative.  Therefore, a negative coefficient 
in the regression results indicates an increase in 
corruption.  Interestingly, two of the variables that 
control for human development (LIFEEXPEC and 
YSCHOOL), are insignificant; however, the third 
(GNIPC), is positive and highly significant.
 The remaining three variables (ELEC, OIL, 
and MINE) test for the resource curse and each 
is significant.  Interestingly, MINE has the only posi-
tive coefficient.  This is consistent with the findings 
of Pegg (2010), who concludes that Botswana’s 
diamond revenues have not caused a resource 
curse, thanks to careful government planning 
Long
Table 2: Key variables for Model 1
Variable Description (Unit of measurement) Expected 
Sign
Dependent
Variables
CCI Measure of corruption N/A
Independent
Variables
LE Life expectancy at birth (years) +
YSCHOOL Mean years of schooling (years) +
GNIPC GNI Per Capita (2008 dollars) +
ELEC Net Electricity Exports/ Total Electricity Production 
(kilowatt hours)
-
OIL Takes value of 1 if country exports oil, 0 if not -
MINE Takes value of 1 if country exports minerals, 0 if not -
Table 3: Key Variables for Model 2
Variable Description Expect-
ed Sign
Dependent
Variable: HDI
A measure of human development, accounting for 
income, schooling, and life expectancy
N/A
Independent
Variable: CCI
A measure of corruption, with positive values
associated with low levels of corruption
-
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and a willingness to invest the revenues into the 
vital sectors of health, education, and infrastruc-
ture.  Perhaps the countries with large mineral 
deposits, such as Botswana and South Africa are 
more equipped to appropriately manage the 
revenues, and have turned their resources into a 
blessing.
 The coefficient for OIL is negative and 
significant, supporting the natural resource curse 
hypothesis.  This is consistent with the findings of 
Williams (2010) and Avom (2010) who find that oil 
revenues cause decreased government trans-
parency, allowing funds to be mismanaged.  This 
finding is also supported by Kojucharov (2007), 
who reports that, despite the World Bank’s best 
efforts to prevent a resource curse, the Chadian 
government misused revenues, preventing eco-
nomic and human development growth.
 The most important result of this study is 
that the coefficient for ELEC is negative and signif-
icant.  This demonstrates that if a country increas-
es electricity exports, it also increases corruption, 
and supports the resource hypothesis that elec-
tricity exports, which can bring large revenues 
thanks to power shortages in Africa, can increase 
corruption, consistent with the Nigerian disease.
 Table 5 presents the results of Model 2, 
which tests 
w h e t h e r 
cor rupt ion 
negat ive ly 
i m p a c t s 
s t a n d a r d 
of living.  It 
is impor-
tant to note 
that cor-
rupt coun-
tries have 
n e g a t i v e 
values for 
CCI, while 
benevolent 
c o u n t r i e s 
have posi-
tive values. 
The coef-
ficient for 
CCI is posi-
tive and sig-
nificant, indi-
cating that an increase in “goodness” causes an 
increase in HDI.  Conversely, increasing corruption 
negatively impacts HDI.  It is interesting to note 
that the R-squared value for Model 2 is .290, sug-
gesting that nearly thirty percent of the variation 
of standard of living is explained by the model.
 The results of Model 2 intuitively make 
sense.  If a government official is corrupt, and 
is diverting funds for personal gain, those funds 
cannot be used to promote health, education, 
or infrastructure.  They are also consistent with the 
findings of Avom (2010), who determines that cor-
ruption that is caused by resource dependency 
reduces human capital development and reve-
nue growth.  Williams (2010), finds that corruption 
prevents economic growth, further supporting the 
findings of Model 2.
 Combining the findings of Models 1 and 
2 demonstrates that electricity exports increase 
corruption, and therefore reduce quality of life in 
Africa.  Model 1 finds that an increase in electricity 
exports in Africa causes an increase in corruption. 
Model 2 finds that corruption decreases standard 
of living.  Thus, by transitive property, electricity 
exports decrease standard of living, supportive of 
the resource curse hypothesis.
VI. CONCLUSION
 There exists an electricity shortage 
throughout most of Africa.  Grids are unreliable, 
causing frequent blackouts.  Villages without ac-
cess to power grids are common, and this greatly 
lowers quality of life.  This shortage causes elec-
tricity to be very valuable.  Intuitively, the coun-
tries that have learned to produce electricity effi-
ciently enough to export it to neighboring nations 
should be better off than those who haven’t.  That 
is, electricity exports should be a ‘blessing’ to the 
Long
Table 4: Regression Results for Model 1
Variable Coefficient
Constant -1.396***
(-3.914)
ELEC -.086*
(-2.065)
OIL -.472***
(-4.338)
MINE .488***
(3.941)
LIFEEXPEC .006
(.931)
GNIPC 8.746E-5***
(5.462)
YSCHOOL -.016
(-.508)
***significant at the .001 level
*significant at the .02 level
Dependent Variable: CCI
R-Square: .539
Observations: 100
Numbers in parenthesis are T-values
Table 5: Regression Results for Model 2
Variable Coefficient
Constant .544***
(29.691)
CCI .132***
(6.319)
***significant at the .001 level
Dependent Variable: HDI
R-Squared: .290
Observations:100
Numbers in parenthesis are T- values
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people of Africa.
 The natural resource curse attempts to ex-
plain why the people of resource rich countries 
often do not receive any benefit from resource 
revenues.  Specifically, in countries affected by 
the Nigerian disease, corrupt officials misuse rev-
enues for personal gain, diverting funds away 
from the vital sectors of health, education, and 
infrastructure.   This project helps to determine 
whether revenues from electricity exports can 
actually reduce quality of life in African countries, 
by means of a resource curse.  It fills a gap in the 
literature by testing for a previously unexamined 
cause of the resource curse.
 Two separate OLS regressions are used 
to test the hypothesis that electricity exports can 
cause a corruption driven resource curse (the 
Nigerian disease), and that this harms standard 
of living in Africa.  Model 1 measures whether re-
source exports increase corruption, while control-
ling for human development.  The model finds that 
oil and electricity exports do increase corruption, 
providing evidence of a Nigerian disease.  Model 
2 attempts to determine whether corruption has 
a negative impact on quality of life.  Unsurprising-
ly, the model finds that corruption does reduce 
standard of living.  By the transitive property, if 
electricity exports cause corruption, and corrup-
tion reduces standard of living, then electricity ex-
ports reduce standard of living.  These conclusions 
support this project’s hypothesis that electricity 
exports cause a Nigerian disease, that negatively 
impacts the quality of life for the people of Africa.
This research could be expanded by compiling a 
larger data set.  If more countries were included 
over a longer time period, the sample would be-
come a better representative of the African con-
tinent.  Additionally, a model developed to test 
for the Dutch disease could provide increased 
understanding of how this particular instance of 
the curse operates.
 The findings of this study imply that poverty 
may be a more complex problem than previously 
imagined, and that there are additional potential 
causes that must be explored.  It also stresses the 
importance of efficient revenue management 
for governments, as corruption is a significant de-
terminant of standard of living.  Finally, it demon-
strates that a natural resource curse is not inevi-
table, as mineral exports were shown to decrease 
corruption, thereby promoting quality of life.
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